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Abstract 
In contrast to the Western ideal of secularization, religion has in some 
cultures maintained its important role in nationalist undertakings. This 
is the case in Myanmar, a country that is currently in the midst of a 
state transformation towards democracy after more than fifty years of 
authoritarian, military rule. This religious nationalism has been taken 
to a higher level of chauvinism and violence between the Buddhist 
majority and the Muslim minority, in particular towards the Rohingya 
minority form Rakhine state. In order to understand why and how 
Theravada Buddhism’s ideas, discourses and practices have been 
interpreted for political and nationalist purposes, this thesis will make 
use of nationalism theories, in relation to religion, and understand how 
the merge of those two concepts has lead to the current ethnical 
clashes. The research aims at assessing the role and power of 
Buddhism in the context of Burmese nationalism through a narrative 
analysis of sources such as NGO reports, newspaper articles, 
academic writings and second-hand interviews. The analysis 
concludes that it is not so much Buddhism in itself that has lead to the 
current anti-Muslim narratives and inter-religious clashes, but rather 
the use of its teachings and symbols, by the monkhood and the state, 
to gain legitimacy and to justify vehement discourses and actions.  
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Context 
In a world dominated by the occidental ideal of secularization and modernization, 
religion is increasingly regarded as an element that ought to be separated from 
politics, from economy and from anything that has to do with the nation-state in 
general because of its history of irrational and conflictual tendencies (Friedland, 
2001). However, this perspective is not universally shared, as the relationship 
between nation, more particularly nationalism, and religion has either re-emerged 
or been strengthened over the past years in certain parts of the world. In fact, 
countries experiencing a shift in their organisation, functioning and structure often 
need elements allowing a strong nation building around common ideals, and 
among the list of tools reinforcing a nation’s identity such as education, folklore 
and communication, we find religion. The combination of two strong and deep 
concepts such as nationalism and religion is an effective way of creating 
movements of unity, faith and security (Kinnvall, 2004), but it can also have 
devastating effects by nourishing hatred and violence on a fragile, unstable and 
ethnically diverse country.  
In former Burma, now known as Myanmar, Buddhist nationalism is a growing 
issue that results from a longstanding history of colonisation and military 
dictatorship in a context of ethnical – and thus religious – diversity. In fact, 
despite Myanmar’s recent democratic and economic development, violence and 
instability are still inherently present across the country, especially in Rakhine 
(previously named Arakan) state. Over the course of the past years, the tension 
between Buddhist nationalists and Muslim minorities, the Rohingya in particular, 
has grown into a dangerous strain of racism and intolerance. Despite the 2008 
Burmese Constitution, which supposedly provides religious freedom, there is an 
underlying recognition of the special position of Theravada Buddhism as the faith 
professed by the great majority of the citizens (89%), thus providing the majority 
with a numerical advantage that has turned into a moral authority. The limits of 
religious freedom are perfectly illustrated in the oppression and prejudice 
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conducted against Myanmar’s Islamic faction, which are keeping the country 
from attaining a stable and democratic situation, but they also shed light on an 
unknown face of Buddhism. In fact, what started as a process led by the former 
military dictatorship is now carried-out by high-ranked Buddhist monks, who act 
out of fear of losing racial and religious purity (Zarni, 2013). Thus, Myanmar’s 
President Thein Sein’s suggestion to expel the Rohingya to other countries in 
order to get rid of them once and for all is greatly supported by the country’s 
religious elite, who openly expresses their aversion, which results in ethnical 
clashes, population displacements and inevitably death (Human Rights Watch, 
2013). The violence is not always direct however, but is also expressed in other 
forms such as social and economical pressure. One of them is the 969 Movement, 
an islamophobic nationalist effort encouraging people to avoid engaging in any 
Muslim-run businesses. The movement and the contiguous rhetoric is lead by 
radical Buddhist Monks who are militating against the Muslim minority that they 
accuse of being a threat to the country’s culture and religion (Beech, 2013).  
This clearly contradicts the Western popular image of Buddhism as a peaceful, 
humanistic and nonaggressive doctrine, immune to vehemence and violence, as 
well as it upends conventional stereotypes of conflictual Muslims on the one side, 
and Buddhists as emissaries of peace on the other (Malik, 2013). In the 
assessment of religious extremism, Buddhism has largely been set aside due to its 
image of nonviolence, empathy and loving kindness promulgated by Siddhartha 
Gautama (known as the Buddha).  However, from the Emperor Ashoka’s violent 
empire on the old Indian subcontinent, to the Buddhist monarchies of pre-colonial 
Sri Lanka or the Khmer kingdom, Buddhism has a long history of warfare and 
violence (Marni, 2013) which proves that no faith is immune to politics and 
radicalism, features often anti-ethical to its foundations (Beech, 2013).  
1.2 Research question  
What are the reasons for the religious xenophobic rise in Myanmar? And to what 
extent is Buddhism being used to justify this nationalist violence and intolerance 
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towards the country’s Muslim minorities? Finally, how do the ongoing actions in 
Myanmar reconcile with Buddhist teachings?  
The reconciliation of Buddhism as a philosophy of peace and the ugly reality of 
faith-led pogroms is one of the country’s biggest challenges, and this paper will 
seek to understand how and why Buddhist teachings and scripture are used as a 
support for Burma’s nationalism.  
1.3 Previous research  
For a long time, research and media coverage on Myanmar has focused on Aung 
San Suu Kyi and her political struggle for democracy, which has shadowed the 
ethnical and humanitarian issues the country has had to deal with. However, over 
the past few years, there has been a notable growth of interest in Myanmar and the 
nationalist driven conflicts that are taking place on its territory. Authors such as 
Ian Holliday (2010), Mary Kate Long (2013) and Maung Zarni (2013) have been 
giving much importance to the tension between Muslim minorities and the 
Buddhist majority, just as NGO’s such as Human Rights Watch have tried to 
attract attention to an often-neglected humanitarian issue. Other authors, such as 
Tessa Bartholomeusz (2002), Michael Jerryson and Mark Jurgensmeyer (2010) or 
Laksuri Jayasuriya (2009) have engaged in the analysis of Buddhism as an 
originator of violence and conflict, thus revealing the frequently shadowed side of 
the faith. Such authors will be very helpful in assessing the motivations and 
thoughts behind vehement Buddhists in Myanmar, even though their take on 
Buddhism in relation to Just War will not be considered in this thesis. Moreover, 
the study of nationalism in a Buddhist context has been reviewed by authors such 
as Catarina Kinnvall (2002, 2004) or Gorski and Türkmen-Dervisoglu (2013), 
who provide with an important basis for this research. Finally, recent articles 
discussing the specific issue of Buddhist nationalism in the Burmese context have 
been written by, amongst others, Mikael Gravers (2013), Hannah Beech (2013) or 
Tatsushi Arai (2013), which all provide with an stimulating and useful analysis of 
the situation.  
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1.4 Importance and aim of study  
The expansion and urgency of Myanmar’s situation, particularly regarding 
Muslim minorities such as the Rohingya, make it necessary to shed light on the 
humanitarian crisis that is taking place in the region. In fact, the fragility of the 
country’s political situation, the destructive consequences of the clashes as well as 
the imminence of a spill-over to the neighbouring Southeast Asian countries 
(Coates, 2013) makes investigations – and more importantly actions and 
engagements – necessary and irrefutable. In fact, not only does this make it a 
highly topical matter for social studies and political science in particular, it is also 
imperative that academics and researchers highlight the gravity of the situation so 
that the international community can speak up and take the necessary measures to 
stop the current disaster. In order to do so, this paper will seek to distance itself 
from the traditional religious warfare study, stereotyping Islam as a faith 
impregnated with violence and either neglecting Buddhism or putting in a 
category full of peaceful, positive and non-violent stereotypes. Thus, by focusing 
on a faith that has been overlooked in the Western conflict literature, this thesis 
will attempt to highlight the limits of religious nationalism as well as the use and 
interpretation of a faith for political and nationalistic purposes.  
1.5 Key concepts  
1.5.1 Nationalism  
In order to make use of religious nationalism as a theoretical framework for this 
case study, it is necessary to specify the terms in which nationalism is defined. 
Drawing on Friedland’s (2001:137) designation, nationalism is “a form of state 
representation (…) grounding the identity and legitimacy of a state in a population 
of individuals who inhabit a territory bounded by that state”. Moreover, 
nationalism, as the political procedures ordered through the state in the name of 
the nation, creates the nation, not the contrary. Hence, it is a discursive habit “by 
which the territorial identity of a state and the cultural identity of the people 
whose collective representation it claims are constituted as a singular institutional 
fact” (Friedland, 2001:138), thus joining together state, territoriality and culture. 
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In addition to that, this thesis will make use of Benedict Anderson’s (1991) 
famous work on “Imagined Communities”, in which nationalism is defined as an 
element that constructs the nation around the link between each members of the 
country, who will most likely never meet each other, but are related through a 
shared history, kinship, culture and religion. It is the belief and shared identity of 
those members that create a community, as the force of ethnicity is found in the 
significance attached to our own identities and the ones of others. Individuals thus 
seek to secure a sphere where they can freely and commonly express their 
identities, practice their cultural habits, sustain their beliefs and educate the future 
generations in a common and shared time and space (Anderson, 1991).   
1.5.2 Ethnic minority group 
According to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2014), the 
definition of ethnic minorities is based on “national, ethnic, cultural, religious and 
linguistic identity”. Despite the fact that there is no universally agreed listing of 
which groups constitute minorities, it is stressed that any definition of the latter 
must include both objective factors relating to shared identity, language or 
religion, as well as subjective factors that embrace the individuals feeling of 
belonging to the said group. The difficulty in defining clearly who constitutes a 
minority lies in the important variety of situations and contexts in which 
individuals live and what ties them together. Every state has one or more minority 
groups, and according to the United Nations Minorities Declaration of 1992, it is 
the state’s responsibility to protect them. The Rohingya, despite their non-
recognition by the Burmese state, fall into the almost all points of the definition 
offered by Francesco Capotori, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-
Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 
1977, which states that a minority is “a group numerically inferior to the rest of 
the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being 
nationals of the State – possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics 
differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a 
sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or 
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language” (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014). In fact, 
the non-recognition of the Rohingya as Burmese citizens makes the situation 
complex, but the group is however legally considered as a Muslim Minority in 
Myanmar (Human Rights Watch, 2013a).  
1.5.3 Conflict 
“Conflict” is a wide and complex notion that could be debated over and over 
without reaching any final conclusive definition. For the purpose of this study, it 
is important to stress the fact that the term takes into account both “direct” and 
physical conflict such as the actual clashes between Rakhine Buddhists and the 
Rohingya, but is also embraces moral and ideological conflicts that arise through 
narratives, campaigns or other nationalistic and xenophobic conducts. To define 
what constitutes a conflict, this dissertation will be based on Johan Galtung’s 
(1996) description, which states that conflict can be defined as an incompatibility 
in attitude, a behaviour and a contradiction. The first designates what is rooted in 
a society or in the individuals constituting it, thus it is related to a certain culture 
as well as the perception people have of themselves and of others. The second is 
comprehended in relation to the reaction the individual and/or a group towards its 
environment, which can be either violent or nonviolent, but is always visible. 
Finally, a contradiction is an issue that goes against the beliefs and ideas of a 
group, or that challenges the usual way things go.  
It is commonplace that researchers in contemporary conflict studies view conflict 
as a challenge in relationships between the factions. In contrast, in interviews 
carried out by Arai (2013), Burmese Buddhist’s take on conflict places inner 
attributes such as greed, wrong view, anger, etc. in the centre of their conflict 
assessment while placing the resulting human relationships in the background. In 
other words, Buddhist practitioners take into account “the source, nature and 
perceived effect of social conflict as a subjective, experiential process that is 
internal to their mind, while interpreting the resulting relationships as an 
externalized effect of what the view as an essentially internal process” (Arai, 
2013: 8).  
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1.6 Limitations 
The fact that this paper’s subject is quite recent and topical makes it hard to find 
revised and detailed analytical literature. Despite the growing number of 
newspaper articles, NGO reports, and conferences discussing Myanmar’s actual 
ethnic conflicts, the amount of academic research assessing the matter is still quite 
limited. Considering the controversy of the matter, the information and material 
related to the conflicts and convoluted ideologies are rarely completely neutral 
and objective as they are frequently emanating from interviews, speeches and 
newspapers. Consequently, since the relevant authors are often taking position, 
the analysis could be exposed to a certain lack of impartiality, which will however 
be avoided at best with the use of analytical academic literature and official 
reports. Moreover, the influence of Western perspectives and concepts (such as 
secularization, Buddhism as a pacific faith, colonial remainders, etc.) could 
disturb or misrepresent the actual discourses, ideas and events taking place in 
former Burma. In order to prevent this, much attention will be given to a diversity 
of local authors and media, so as to try to grasp different angles and viewpoints of 
the situation.  
Because of very limited amount of narratives and testimonies stemming from the 
Rohingyas and other Muslim minorities, this study will mainly be centred on 
official religious and governmental viewpoints. Even though it would be 
enriching to include the minorities’ stance and views about the current situation, 
this thesis seeks to understand the issue from a Buddhist nationalist perspective, 
and hence the lack of those narratives does not weaken the study in any 
substantial way. Also, the literary, practical and doctrinal manifestations of 
Buddhism are too complex to be fully grasped and made justice to. In order not to 
make any confusion or to draw any drastic conclusion, this paper does not pretend 
to analyse and argue on any particular element of the Buddhist faith, neither does 
it go too deep in any purely spiritual discourse. Also, it is worth noting that first of 
all, this thesis’ arguments might not be transferrable to other cases, since 
Myanmar’s situation is unique. Also, one should not be tempted to generalize the 
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narratives put forward for the study’s purposes, as the narratives expressed by 
Wirathu, its followers or the Burmese government are not always supported inside 
the country. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the conflicts in Myanmar are going on 
as this thesis is being written, and that the situation on the ground is rapidly 
changing. This makes it difficult to give a definitive oversight of the conflict and 
to elaborate conclusive remarks about the conflict in itself. Nevertheless, 
whatever events might occur after the completion of this dissertation, the essential 
original sources and justifications for the conflict will remain the same no matter 
the outcomes, thus the light will be put on those. 
1.7 Thesis structure  
After this brief introduction, a factual presentation of Myanmar as well as a 
glance at its historical background will be provided, in order to easily comprehend 
the current context and happenings. Due to the conflict’s deep historical, political 
and social roots, it does in fact seem indispensable to draw a timeline with the 
different key dates and events that have shaped the country’s present structure. 
Because of Burma’s rich and long history the account has to begin at a certain 
point of reference, and for practical and logical reasons it will start in 1923, date 
of the commencement of the British occupation, and go through the succession of 
military juntas, dictatorships and other political, social and religious events that 
have taken place until today.  
Second, a presentation of the study’s theoretical framework, namely religious 
nationalism, will be given. Moreover, the combination of two broad and 
comprehensive concepts such as religion and nationalism combined require some 
deepening such as an outline of the concepts of nation-building, national identity 
or the Self and Other dichotomy, but always in relation to religion.  
Finally, after laying down the abovementioned fundamentals for a holistic 
understanding of the matter, the analysis in itself will be done and discussed. The 
latter will treat the problematic, starting with an assessment of the different 
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narratives, claims and goals put forward by the issue’s central actors –the 
nationalist monks, the lay people and the Burmese government– as well as their 
actions. Those will be scrutinized in relation to Buddhist scripture and teachings, 
in order to highlight not only the use of religion in the various declarations and 
activities, but also the discrepancies between the theory and practice, and their 
alignment with the faith’s dogmas. Finally, an estimation of the looming spill-
over effects caused by the clashes will be given, as well as a presentation of 
occurred events showing that the fear and hatred has already spread beyond the 
Burmese borders.  
2. Presentation of Myanmar and Historical Background 
This chapter will bring out the necessary factual data and historical information 
for the understanding of Myanmar’s current situation, as well as recapitulate the 
ethnical clashes since their upsurge in June 2012. 
2.1 Factual presentation  
Myanmar – officially called Republic of the Union of Myanmar - is located in 
South-eastern Asia and shares borders with Thailand, Laos, China, India and 
Bangladesh. It is formed along the coasts of the Andaman Sea and the Bay of 
Bengal (see map in Appendices). It’s population is composed of 8 official ethnic 
majority groups, with 68% of it being Burman, 9% Shan, 7% Karen, 4% Rakhine, 
3% Chinese, 2% Indian, 2% Mon and 5% other. Almost 9 out of 10 people belong 
to the Theravada Buddhist community, and 4% are Christian, 4% Muslim, 1% 
Animist and 2% other (World Factbook, 2014).  
Since March 2011, Myanmar is a presidential republic and the government form 
is a Parliamentary one, with President Thein Sein at its head. Legislative authority 
is conferred to a bicameral Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), which 
consists of a 224-seat House of Nationalities (Amyotha Hluttaw) and a 440-seat 
House of Representatives (Pyithu Hluttaw). Three-fourths of the members of each 
chamber are directly elected, as the residual quarter is appointed by the military, 
which keeps a substantial level of influence. The 2008 constitution provides the 
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president with executive authority, and the latter is elected to a five-year term by 
the House of Representatives and heads the National Defence and Security 
Council (NDSC) (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014).  
2.2 Historical background  
The present situation in Myanmar stems from complex social and political roots 
that need to be understood in order to fully grasp the extent of the issue. Even 
though Burma has a long and rich history that started way before the British 
colonisation, the current issues are to some extent the result of the colonial rule; 
hence it seems relevant to start the historical review from that period – which 
serves a point of reference only – and forward. In fact, before the colonial rule the 
Burmese king detained the role of primary protector of the country and Buddhism 
was depicted as the symbol of cosmological stability and harmony. When the 
British entered the country and established imperial control they deposed the king, 
and inevitably neglected its institutional task of supporting and protecting the 
monkhood. From that moment, many Burmese Buddhists claim that a 
deterioration of monastic rules and traditions followed, resulting in a decline in 
Buddhist morality in the country. As a consequence, a quest for the protection and 
the propagation of the faith became democratized with an increase in monastic 
groups as well as lay people that organized politically on behalf of their nation 
and religion. This represents the basis for our analysis, and the following pages 
will add some historical facts about Myanmar’s history that will allow a better 
understanding of the current concerns (Walton, 2013). 
2.2.1 From 1823 to 1948: Colonial occupation and Burmese independence  
Like previously mentioned, much of what happens in Myanmar today can be 
traced back to the British colonisation that started with British-Burmese wars in 
the mid-1820s, even though official ruling began in 1885 only. At that time, the 
country had no modern state, no frontiers, and was thus quite easy for the British 
to take over. They did so in ways that did not fit the rules of tenable nation 
building, because the colonial project was motivated more by imperial control 
than by national development. During their stay, the British decided to eliminate 
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the Monarchy and to dissociate the government from religion, thus stripping the 
monkhood (Sangha) from its traditional prestige and official benefaction. In 
parallel, the forced demise of the monarch added up on the devastating effects of 
the colonial period. In response, many resorted to guerrilla warfare to fight back 
against the imperial occupation, which was led by former officials, royal princes, 
former officials of the royal army, etc. but most of them were punished and 
executed for their opposition (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2014).  
Moreover, the British imposed divergent modes of ruling across the country, 
exercising direct rule in central Burma and indirect rule in the surrounding state, 
thus creating a “patchwork of governance arrangements” (Holliday, 2010: 117) 
with catastrophic consequences on the country’s ethnic relations – a recast of 
ethnicity and identity in Burma. Furnivall (in Holliday, 2010) indeed identified 
the Burmese society during the colonial period as a “medley of people that are 
mixed but do not combine”, due to the fact that the four main racial groups – 
European, Chinese, Indian and native – were held together not by social or 
cultural ties, but only by an economic nexus. By the time Burma gained 
independence in 1948, the country was deeply divided, not only into the four 
aforementioned groups, but also by the ethnic varieties inside those factions. The 
decolonisation was rushed, shadowed by the Indian independence, and done with 
no concern for ethnic relations. As a result, soon after the communist revolt in 
April 1948, ethnic tensions exploded and uprisings took place in the country 
(Holliday, 2010). 
It is during this period that the tensions between the Buddhist majority and the 
Muslim minority arose. In fact, during World War II, the predominantly Burmese 
Burma Independence Army (BIA) militarily supported the Japanese forces against 
the British, while some ethnic minorities – including the Rohingya – fought in 
support of the British. This inevitably led to violent clashes, especially in Arakan 
(now Rakhine), between the Burmese majorities and minorities, and it is in this 
context that a Muslim armed rebellion began in the region. The latter claimed the 
creation of an independent Muslim state within Burma, in the northern part of 
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Arakan state, a request answered to with violence and repression (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013). 
2.2.2 From 1948 to 2011: Military Dictatorship 
In response to the abovementioned violence, military as well as civilian leaders 
saw no other solution than to reinvigorate and redeploy the colonial security tool 
in order to reinforce the disintegrating country during this important phase of 
postcolonial state transformation. Despite U Nu’s efforts to institute a democratic 
system, the nationalist Burmese army rose as the critical institution within the 
state (Holliday, 2010). By 1962, the ethnic divisions were still deep and 
vivacious. Taking advantage of the country’s fragility, General Ne Win’s army 
seized power in a coup that ceased the Burmese democracy and further reinforced 
the pre-existing issues. A new constitution released in 1974 established a 
configuration – that persists to this day – of seven Burmese divisions and seven 
ethnic states in order to facilitate the control over the country. Later on, a national 
citizenship law established in 1982 identified 135 ethnic groups located within 
eight major national races (the Burmese majority, and seven minorities). 
According to this law, there are three categories of citizenships: citizens, associate 
citizens and naturalized citizens. The first are descendants of residents who lived 
in the country prior to 1823 (start of the British colonisation) or were born of two 
citizen parents and belonging to one of the eight “national races” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2008: 111). The second represents those who acquired citizenship through 
the 1948 Union Citizenship Act, meaning that individuals who could not provide 
proof of any settlement before 1823 could still be eligible for citizenship. Finally, 
the third category consists of individuals who lived in Burma before 1948 and 
applied for citizenship after 1982, when conclusive evidence needed to be 
provided regarding their previous generations living in the country prior to 
independence in 1948. Naturalisation is also possible under certain circumstances, 
such as age (minimum 18 years old), language (fluency in one national language 
at least) and particular personal characteristics (Kipgen, 2013). Thus, this law 
denies citizenship to Muslim minorities such as the Rohingya, who are considered 
	   	  17 
as immigrants from Bangladesh and whose language is not recognized as an 
official national language. Also, without citizenship status, the Rohingya have no 
rights to property, are restricted in their movements, have limited access to 
education and are not allowed to marry and/or have children without 
governmental permission (Long, 2013). This is an important basis for the anti-
Rohingya narratives throughout the country, not only for the nationalist monks 
but also for the government and the lay people. 
Throughout the military rule, numerous clashes between Buddhists and Muslims 
followed in Rakhine state, in which the government led campaigns against the 
Rohingya population as well as it adopted laws and policies resulting in their 
discrimination and segregation (Human Rights Watch, 2008). One of the national 
operations, called Naga Min (Dragon King), was designed to “scrutinize each 
individual living in the State, designating citizens and foreigners in accordance 
with the law and taking actions against foreigners who have filtered into the 
country illegally” (Human Rights Watch, 2013:n.p). In Rakhine State, this 
program turned into a campaign aiming at the expulsion of the Rohingya Muslims 
through brutal mass arrests, killings, raids, and so on. As a result, more than 
200’000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh, where humanitarian access was denied and 
food aid was voluntarily withheld in order to force back the refugees to Burma. 
Thus, in 1979, Burmese President Ne Win agreed to a repatriation program, 
forcibly returning Rohingya to northern Rakhine, which has since then become an 
area of religious and ethnic concentration. The second military operation, Pyi 
Thaya (clean and beautiful nation) was launched in 1991 for the same reasons – 
expelling the Rohingya – and had equal humanitarian consequences on the 
minority.  
26 years after the coup, in 1988, a series of widespread pro-democracy 
manifestations took place due to indignation over economic mismanagement and 
political oppression, known as the 8-8-88 uprisings. As a result, the government 
established plans for elections in 1989 and in June, it changed the country’s 
official English name from the “Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma” to the 
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“Republic of the Union of Myanmar”. The first elections in almost 30 years were 
won by 80% by the National League for Democracy (NLD) – the party of Aung 
San Suu Kyi – but the military junta refused to cede authority and continued to 
rule the country without respect to the society’s demands. In fact, a formal 
military directorate, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) – 
later to be renamed in 1997 the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) – 
was prompted to confiscate power from Ne Win’s military-backed regime and 
take over the country’s authority (Cline, 2009). In the early 1990’s, the military 
dramatically increased their presence in northern Rakhine State, forcing Muslims 
into labour, confiscating land and property, and forcibly deporting Rohingyas – 
once again – to Bangladesh. Moreover, more symbolic persecution was 
conducted, with the ban of any religious Muslim activities or the demolition of 
mosques, which were sometimes replaced with Buddhist temples. In 2007, anti-
government protests, also known as the Saffron Revolution, led by thousands of 
Buddhist monks, finally resulted in the SPDC government crackdown. The 
manifestations resulted in demonstrators being beaten (ca. 200 people) and killed 
(30 to 40 monks and 50 to 70 civilians). However, after these uprisings, the 
government announced a referendum for the Constitution and elections for 2010 
(Booth, 2007). 
2.2.3 From 2010 to present: Governmental reforms 
The implementation of a new constitution in 2008, followed by parliamentary 
elections in 2010 and the opening of the Parliament in January 2011 have shifted 
Myanmar’s political situation from a military junta to a presidential republic with 
multi-party elections. In fact, as part of a transformation of the political system, 
the Tatmadaw (the Myanmar Armed Forces) transferred formal authority, after 
more than 20 years of direct rule, to a nominally civilian government following 
Myanmar’s first multi-party election since 1990 (Macdonald, 2013). However, the 
electoral manipulations and other constitutional stipulations have given office to a 
government largely consisted of former military officers who are closely aligned 
with the Tatmadaw, thus transferring the ruling regime from a military one to an 
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Electoral Authoritarian form and ensuring a certain primacy of the old order. 
More precisely, the Tatmadaw exists beyond government supervision and has a 
noteworthy representative body in Parliament through the ruling Union Solidarity 
and Development Party (USDP), which mainly consists of former military/junta 
officials (Guilloux, 2010). As Adam Macdonald (2013) describes it, there has 
been a change in but not of the ruling regime, thus still favouring the military 
establishment and their allies. Nevertheless, the opening of the political sphere 
and civil society opens up doors and gives space for new actors, identities and 
relationships. The transition to a civilianised government has also given birth to a 
series of political, social and economic reforms, which will need to respond to the 
many issues that have been raised by the civil society and the international 
community (Pedersen, 2013).  
2.3 Conflict recapitulation  
Even though the ethnic and religious tensions between Rakhine Buddhists and 
Rohingya Muslims have been going on for decades, the wave of violence took 
another level in June 2012. In Rakhine State, where the conflict began, the 
majority of the population are Burmese, mostly Buddhist. The minor Muslim 
population of the State is primarily made up of two groups, the first being the 
Kaman, which is part of the 135 officially recognized ethnic groups in the 
country. The second is the Rohingya, who claim to be indigenous to the Rakhine 
state in spite of the government’s contrary claims. In fact, because of the lighter 
demographic pressure in Rakhine state, many of the early Muslim migrants 
arrived in the region from Bengal in the context of the Bay of Bengal trade before 
the thirteenth century. Slowly, Bengali Muslims came to represent a substantial 
minority of Rakhine’s population, which increased during the British occupation 
and encouraged South Asian migration into the region. In spite of this long-lasting 
presence on Myanmar’s territory, the government and Myanmar’s population still 
refute any bond between the Rohingya and the Burmese territory (Coclanis, 
2013). This might also be due to the fact that the ethnic group’s religious beliefs, 
social customs and physical features are different from those of the native 
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Burmese, which increases their marginalisation and the violations of their rights 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013).  
The Rohingya accuse the Rakhine state government as well as the central 
government of deliberate attempt to eliminate them and thus defined the violence 
as a state-encouraged ethnic cleansing – a statement which is supported by NGO’s 
and other members of the international community (Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
The government refutes such accusations, but has nonetheless failed to come up 
with concrete solutions (Kipgen, 2013). The tensions thus transformed into actual 
clashes in June 2012, after the alleged rape and assassination of a Buddhist 
Rakhine woman by three Muslim men, in Rakhine State. Ten Muslim men were 
killed on a bus by a mob of retaliating Rakhine Buddhists, and the fighting spread 
to a larger scale with casualties on both sides – even though observers agree that 
the Rohingya suffered a greater loss of life and property due to poor preparation 
and material. In response to criticisms from the international community and 
various rights groups towards the Myanmar government for not taking the 
necessary measures, Thein Sein formed a 16-member committee to investigate the 
case. The committee concluded that the violence was a consequence of mutual 
distrust and religious differences, which generated hatred and vengeance between 
Buddhists and Muslims. After the report, relief camps were set up to 
accommodate both Rohingyas and Rakhines with the help of both national and 
international funding (Kipgen, 2013).  
In October 2012, despite the declaration of a state of emergency in Rakhine state, 
the tension lead to a second violent outbreak, which caused the death and injury of 
200 and the displacement of approximately 100’000 Rohingya (Walton, 2013). 
Moreover, almost 3000 homes were destroyed, and 14 religious buildings were set 
on fire (Kipgen, 2013). The violence soon spread across the country, involving 
not only Rohingya, but also Muslims in general. In particular, Kaman Muslims 
from southern Rakhine were victims of Buddhist attacks, even though they are 
part of the 135 recognised ethnic group with full citizenship rights. For instance, 
in March 2013 the town of Meikhtila gave place to islamophobic riots that lead to 
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dozens of deaths as a consequence of Buddhists burning Muslim homes, schools 
and mosques. The uprisings were a response to a jewellery store quarrel and the 
assassination of a Buddhist monk by Muslims. In spite of the – minimal – 
measures taken by the government, violent incidents of this sort have kept on, as 
the vehemence between the two factions grows and the humanitarian implications 
keep on getting bigger (Human Rights Watch, 2013; Walton, 2013).  
3. Theoretical Framework  
As a case combining nationalism and religion, the study of Myanmar’s upraising 
conflicts between Buddhists and Muslims needs to be analysed through the 
theoretical lens of religious nationalism. More specifically, this paper will seek to 
understand and grasp the symbolic dimension of the ongoing violence through a 
rationalist approach in an attempt to explain the movement claiming the purity of 
the Burmese nation in terms of religion (Gorski and Türkmen-Dervisoglu, 2013).  
Barker (2009) defines religious nationalism as a sentiment occurring when a 
specific faith is “central… to conceptions of what it means to belong to the given 
nation” (Barker, 2009: 13), which is accurate in the case of Myanmar’s Buddhist 
nationalists, who identify their nation in terms of ethnicity and religion. In fact, 
despite the contradiction that might come to one’s mind when thinking about 
religion and nationalism due to the western association of modernity with 
secularity (Friedland, 2001), religion and nationalism can in some cases – like 
Myanmar – be tightly interrelated. Using religious nationalism – and what derives 
from it, such as, among others, national identity building – as a framework will 
also be useful in analysing and explaining the sources of the Buddhist nationalism 
itself, by questioning the conditions and reasons behind the violence induced by 
nationalist mobilization for religious means (Gorski and Türkmen-Dervisoglu, 
2013).  
3.1 Religion & Nationalism  
When thinking of nationalism, the Western perspective is usually related to 
modernity and to a separation of the religious and the political. In fact, during the 
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late eighteenth century’s Enlightenment and onwards, the ideals of a nation-state 
revolved around models of rationalism, materialism, universalism and secularism 
(Kinnvall, 2002). Knitting a country together was then done through education, 
economical development, the construction of roads and the improvement of 
transportation and communication. Religion’s role was decreased and even 
excluded from the process, as secular nationalism was seen to be primarily 
political and economical, but also universally applicable and morally right. The 
detachment and differentiation of religion within the public sphere was considered 
as the modern way of constructing and organizing the state (Friedland, 2001). In 
fact, like Alexis de Tocequville argued, secular nationalism would counter 
religion and “like Islam, overrun the whole world with its apostles, militants and 
martyrs” (de Tocqueville, 1955: 13), making it the natural and ideological way 
towards a successful nation-building.  
However, just as many occidental scholars have relied on a reality based on an 
evident separation between the nation and religion, many civilizations such as 
Myanmar tend to maintain the importance of religion in their political claims. In 
fact, religion has, in many parts of the world, maintained its status of evident 
framework for social order competing with secular nationalism, the former allied 
with ethnic communities and the latter with the nation state. One can thus 
consider secularism as a predominantly Western and Christian form of political 
culture, which is seen by the occidental society as the way to modernity. On the 
contrary, other cultures see religion, Buddhism in this case, as a provider of 
images and precepts for society, for the foundations of the state and for the 
regulation of social life. In those situations, the divine laws are inseparable from 
the ones of the state, because of the governing guidelines they provide (Friedland, 
2001). Religious nationalism is then even stronger and deeper, as the 
intertwinement between the two is clearly rooted and transcendent in social, 
political and religious life. Hence, it is important to acknowledge the different 
insights and practices between scholarly perceptions and the Burmese reality 
regarding the matter, and without claiming any objectivity or truthfulness, trying 
to take into consideration those dissimilar cultural roots. As a result, the twentieth 
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and beginning of the twenty-first century have been open to new possibilities of 
order which take into account a synthesis of both currents, making them not only 
rivals but also allies for social order (Jurgensmeyer, 2010). 
But how can religion and nationalism be associated and used simultaneously for 
one and the same purpose? First of all, both consist of a discursive, often 
essentialist, view of their nature and existence as a whole. In order to maintain 
themselves, especially their identity, both have to claim their superiority trough a 
particular notion of truth and justify their traditions and resultant actions by 
rational and thought-trough stories. Thus, both nationalism and religion evolve 
around imaginations of ordering power and considerations of how one should 
relate to those (Friedland, 2001). Moreover, institutionalised religion, in a similar 
sense to the nation, is territorially bounded as it relates to a consistent structure 
and defined entities such as a national territory, churches, groupings and 
organisations that indirectly supply answers and comfort to individuals or groups 
in search for a sense of unity, wholeness and belonging (Kinnvall, 2004). Both are 
thus intertwined, as religious elements are turned into national symbols and 
national events and locations are used in religious myths, all combined in order to 
create a common identity (Kinnvall, 2004).  
Like Jurgensmeyer (2010) notes, the best-known cases of religious conflict in the 
contemporary world have taken place in regions where it is difficult to define or 
accept a particular idea of nation state. Myanmar is a perfect example of this 
statement, since it has for many decades been victim of irregular extremist politics 
based on uncertainties on the form that the state should take, and what 
components of society should lead it. Religion, specifically Buddhism, has 
provided the “basis for a new national consensus and a new kind of leadership” 
(Jurgensmeyer, 2010: 268). Adding up on this, Catarina Kinnvall (2004) argues 
that individuals – as well as the groups in which they belong – tend to “become 
more ontologically insecure and existentially uncertain” (p.741) due to the general 
globalization of economics, politics and human affairs. In order to seek support 
and reaffirmation of ones self-identity, parties approach collectives that reinforce 
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the feeling of security and comfort, which is often found in the combination of 
religion and nationalism. The latter do in fact prove relevant for providing 
reassurance and security compared to other identities such as language, race, 
gender or sexuality, in a time when increasing demands on the individual are 
being made (Kinnvall, 2002). This identity construction is particularly true in 
times of rapid readjustment and delicate future, like it is currently the case in 
Myanmar, since it allows unconditional constructs and selected traumas in ways 
that the other identity signifiers might not. This phenomenon explains why leaders 
(political, religious, economical, and so on) tactically use simple causes to unite 
the people around a common ideology. As previously mentioned, nationalism 
provides a particularly strong foundation for triggering images of unity, security 
and power, but so does religion. Both are imaged as elements reflecting reality as 
it is, but also as resting on solid ground and most of all, as being “true”. In order 
to rally individuals around religion and nationalism – also called “identity 
signifiers” – the latter are linked to chosen histories, both good and bad, and to 
various symbols, memories or myths, thus tracing the constructed lineage of the 
particular identity group back to a common and specific time and place that will 
be used as a guide for future actions (Kinnvall, 2004). 
Moreover, religion and nationalism both suggest that there are levels of meaning 
underneath the everyday world that give consistency to untouchable effects, as 
well as they offer the necessary authority that provides the political and social 
order with their reason for being. They define the right way of behaving in 
society, and link individuals together by tying them to a larger collectivity 
associated with particular places and histories. The latter is important, as going 
beyond the function of moral order, the sense of location – historical or practical – 
provides individuals with a sense of belonging to a larger, national embrace 
(Jurgensmeyer, 2010). Furthermore, both religion and nationalism respond to 
questions of identity but also to interrogations about the existence of the Other, as 
well as they provide order in times of chaos and uncertainty. They also introduce 
clear and holistic notions of “truth”, including the people who adhere to the given 
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answers but also excluding those who reject them, which prepares the ground for 
positions of intolerance and marginalisation (Kinnvall, 2004).  
3.2 Identity & Nation Building 
Nation building seems to be an obligatory and inevitable undertaking for all states 
around the world, but it has been particularly strong in ancient colonial regions 
such as Asia, where cultural and linguistic differences have been repressed in 
order to build single national frameworks often inherited from imperial rulers 
(Holliday, 2010). As Benedict Anderson famously describes, nations are 
“imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991), which suggests that nationalism 
inevitably precedes the nation and that both are deliberately constructed around 
specific lines and features. Myanmar is no exception, since the junta has for 
several decades echoed one-nation strategies found in countries like China and 
has tried – and to a certain degree succeeded – to establish a form of harmonious 
nationalism constructed around the foundation of Bamar Buddhism, thus rallying 
the Burmese people around a single language, identity and religion held in an 
ideal harmony by all major ethnic groups (Holliday, 2010). Considering the great 
ethnic diversity and disputes in the country, as well as the inter-cultural mixes 
resulting from marriage leading to hyphenated identities, the success was quite 
narrow, thus failing to build a modern nation state has been a major cause for the 
collapse of democracy and the difficulties to restore it. 
3.3 Self & Other 
The abovementioned construction of the Other leads to a distinctive definition of 
who belongs to the national territory, of who is “pure”, both nationally and 
religiously. The construction of self and Other is always done in an attempt to 
create positions of inferiority and superiority, the latter being represented by the 
ones inside (in this case inside both the nation and the religion) who represent 
truth, good, purity, while falsity, bad and dirtiness is descriptions stuck on the 
ones on the outside. The Other is then seen as despicable and worth less than the 
self, and the transformation of the Other as the enemy justifies acts to maintain 
boundaries between the two (Kinnvall, 2004). This phenomenon is undoubtedly 
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present in Myanmar. In fact, the essentialist ideas of both the nation (Myanmar) 
and the religion (Buddhism) have been interpreted in ways that justify the 
exclusion and/or segregation of minorities such as the Muslim Rohingya.  
This adds a third notion to the nation/religion relation, which is racism. In fact, 
stemming from a need for separateness and exclusivity, racism is often 
constructed and disguised in discourses of simple cultural, religious and/or 
ethnical differences. In fact, like Kinnvall (2002, 2004) explicates, there is a 
predisposition in racism to reject the Other based on religion and culture instead 
of race, and to exclude the Other because of incompatibility rather than of fear 
and xenophobia. In the case of Buddhist nationalists, the Muslims living in the 
country are described as “dangerous”, based on religious, cultural and even 
economical differences but it is seldom admitted that there is a hinge of racism in 
the hatred. There is in fact a “reduction of identity to a number of cultural 
characteristics” (Kinnvall, 2002: 84), which encourages a certain in-group 
essentialism, a demonization of “them” as compared to a sacralisation of “us” that 
will in turn serve as a justification for acts of protection and defence. 
Essentialising the Other is part of the process aimed at constructing its integral 
and singular identity in parallel of a harmonious one of the self (Kinnvall, 2002). 
Religious nationalism often becomes, particularly in this case, a movement 
aiming at the defence of a particular group identity – here Bamar Buddhists – 
based on specific attributes, which in the case of Myanmar are race and religion 
(Friedland, 2001). This might in fact be one of the most salient ways of 
constructing and defining the feared Other by answering existential questions and 
providing essentialised notions of truth and totality (Kinnvall, 2002).  
Moreover, according to Gorski and Turkmen-Dervioglu (2013), there seems to be 
an acknowledgment among scholars that national identities tend to be constructed 
along religious cleavages, like it can be exemplified with the clashes between 
Muslims and Buddhists in Myanmar. Indeed, despite the fact that the country’s 
2008 constitution includes provisions providing religious freedom for all faiths, 
Buddhism still holds a special position, as it is the faith professed by most – 89% 
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– of the citizens. Since religious nationalism only seems viable when there is a 
common religious basis to found the ideology around (Friedland, 2001), 
Buddhism serves as a source for a nationalist authoritarian regime as well as for 
the violent struggles taking place today, since the cleavages between the two 
religions, mixed with nationalist extremism, lead to inevitable vehemence. This 
difference in ethnicity and religion has helped to reinforce the Self/Other duality 
around a Buddhist/Burmese identity, while at the same time neglecting and 
marginalizing the Muslim/Minority ethnicity, which serves as a justification for 
violent discourses and behaviours.  
Hence, the merge of religion and nationalism might first of all provide religious 
legitimacy to the state, as well as give nationalist ideologies a transcendent force 
(Jurgensmeyer, 2010). In doing so, Myanmar’s leaders have borrowed numerous 
features of Buddhist culture, but Buddhist frontrunners have also given 
nationalistic arguments for their religious objectives. From those perspectives, 
both religion and nationalism can be seen as the glue that holds communities 
together through a shared tradition, a specific view of the world and reality, which 
are all described in particular and characteristically cultural terms. However, 
considering the process of “othering” and like it will be explained in the analysis, 
the relationship between the two has been irregular and quite problematic 
regarding issues such as the ones concerning minorities such as the Rohingya.   
As a final remark for this chapter, it is important to note that the religious 
nationalism taking place in Burma does not seek control over material resources 
or the state machinery, but it is rather directed towards the promotion of the 
Buddhist cosmology and code of values, the maintenance of its purity and the 
preservation of the Buddhist Burmese state. In fact, Keddie (in Friedland, 2001) 
makes a distinction between two types of “new religious politics”. On the one 
hand, she categorizes the “fundamentalists” who are driven by an ideal 
conformity of governmental policies and religious dictates, and the “religious 
nationalists” on the other, who follow more communitarian and territorial logics. 
The Burmese monks thus fall into Keddie’s second category, since their 
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discourses and actions do not aim at taking over the country’s authority and 
ruling, neither do they seek broader propagation beyond the state borders. On the 
contrary, they make use of a certain politicized religion that utilises faith as the 
basis for the national identity, as well as the source for ultimate values and 
authority. Like abovementioned, the criterion of judgement is racial and religious 
purity, beyond the compelling interest of the state (Friedland, 2001).   
 
3. Methodological approach 
This chapter describes the methodological considerations that have guided the 
thesis. Ontological and epistemological reflections are presented in order to 
understand what constitutes reality in this study, and how the latter will seek to 
explain and understand it. Moreover, this section will outline the material used as 
well as the framework employed to analyse it. Finally, the different 
methodological limitations will articulated, as well as eventual solutions to 
overpass them.  
3.1 Ontological and epistemological considerations  
As previously mentioned, this research paper is an exploratory qualitative inquiry, 
based on the illustrative case study of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar. The use 
of a qualitative method seems the most convenient because of the more realistic 
and flexible outcomes and perspectives of the actual context and events it 
provides (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). The constantly changing nature and the 
plurality of narratives on the subject makes it essential to approach the matter 
from an ontological perspective portrayed as constructivist, which implies that 
social factors and properties are resulting from the interactions between 
individuals, and thus acknowledges the existence and influence of ethics, culture, 
ideologies and altering relationships (Bryman, 2012). In fact, social 
constructivism suggests that reality and social interactions are shaped by factors 
that cannot be fixed, meaning that questions related to religious nationalism do 
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not have one answer but rather a multitude of interpretations based on different 
contexts, past experiences and even individual considerations (Cresswell, 2009).  
In order to get a holistic and detailed justification for the use of social 
constructivism as a research framework, some central and major elements drawn 
from Gergen and Gergen’s contribution to The SAGE Handbook of Social 
Science Methodology (2007) need to be specified. First of all, the social 
constructivist dialogue emerges from the idea that what we take to be knowledge 
of the world finds its sources in human relationships, thus our perceptions on 
things and matters is shaped by historically and culturally situated social 
processes. This means that there is no transcendent truth, no conclusion or idea 
that is more objective or accurate in its depiction of the world because accuracy is 
usually achieved inside specific communal traditions. Second, the replacement of 
truth and objectivity by interests with what research brings forth emphasizes the 
implications for cultural life that follow from taking any truth claim seriously. In 
fact, what matters is not as much whether an account is commonly true, but rather 
the implications for society – or at least for a certain group – that result from 
taking the said assertion seriously. This concern with consequences leads the 
specific research community – here social scientists – to place value on their 
particular meta-theory of knowledge as well as practices and views of the world, 
meaning that this study will inevitably evolve around certain specific 
constructions and customs and bring interest to a more or less definite group of 
individuals. In fact, the methods and presumptions used in this study are specific 
to the field of social science, political science in particular, meaning that the 
concepts and paradigms utilized to come to a certain conclusion will all be 
relevant to the said field but might not be seen as true or relevant to either another 
scientific field, or to the Burmese society itself. This removes the privilege of any 
group to establish any claim of  “objective knowledge”, of any path to truth, but 
rather attest of one’s commitment to a particular community and its guidelines. 
Finally, the fact that constructivist thought gives attention to coordinated 
relationships rather than to the individual actor unsettles the long-standing 
Western tradition of focus on the individual. In fact, social constructivism sees all 
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we take to be rational and real as emerging from a process of coordination. What 
is considered important is not the addition of individuals coming together to 
create relationships, but the relationships in themselves who are responsible for 
the formation of the individual (Gergen and Gergen, 2007: 461-479). Thus, this 
research will focus on the actual relationships between Myanmar’s Buddhist 
nationalists and the Burmese minorities, between the monks and the lay people, 
between the state and the international community, and so on. All the 
abovementioned factors give place to an open field of possibilities by 
relinquishing any defined road to truth and giving voice to alternative ideas and 
explanations, which represents an important value when assessing an issue such 
as religious nationalism.  
The epistemological position of the research is interpretivist, meaning that rather 
than adopting a natural scientific model like in a quantitative (post-) positivist 
research, the stress is put on the acknowledgment and assessment of the social 
world and the studied matter, through an examination and interpretation of its 
actors (Bryman, 2012).  This implies that the research is influenced and shaped by 
pre-existing theories and worldviews of the researcher, meaning that not only the 
analysed subject – the reality – but also the research itself is a socially constructed 
activity. In fact, from an interpretivist stance, there is no truth in any absolute 
sense but only conclusions and hypothesises emerging from shared beliefs and 
expectations used to understand a particular context (Willis, 2007: 95-147). As 
argued by Smith (1993: 120), “there is no particular right or correct path to 
knowledge, no special method that automatically leads to intellectual progress”, 
which highlights the important of the understanding of a particular situation or 
context rather than the discovery of any universal law or rule. This inter-
subjectivity, and the assumption that knowledge is a compilation of socially 
constructed factors makes it even more important to incorporate data and sources 
from different backgrounds and collection methods. 
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3.2 Material and data  
In order to grasp a wide enough perspective of the matter, this research will 
attempt to take into account a broad variety of material such as media reports, 
official discourses and interviews, but also sources such as academic articles and 
theoretical writings, with a particular attention given to the need to encompass 
different voices and perspectives. Moreover, considering the fact that the studied 
subject is quite recent, thus constricting the relevant academic literature, the 
analysis will have to focus on non academic and rather subjective work such as 
newspaper articles, reports from NGO’s and personal testimonies from central 
actors such as monks or lay people (which are considered second-hand sources 
since they have been collected by journalists or researchers). All those texts and 
documents are not meaningful individually, but need to be considered through 
their connection with each other but also by the nature of their production, 
meaning in which contexts they are created and received (Phillips & Brown, 
1993).  
Multiple forms of data will thus be gathered, which will all be made sense of by a 
review followed by an organisation into themes that cut across all of the sources 
(Cresswell, 2013). Hence, the used data will mostly be second hand sources that 
will be evaluated in-line with Scott’s (1990) four criteria for the assessment of 
secondary sources which are; (1) authenticity of the document, (2) credibility of 
the source, (3) representativeness of the sampling and (4) meaning and accuracy 
of the document.  The choice of an interpretative story is primarily motivated by 
the use of descriptive data to improve, illustrate, support or challenge theoretical 
suppositions made when beginning the study in order to understand the intricacies 
of the analysed situation.  
3.3 Case selection  
As mentioned above, this paper will focus on a particular context and thus make 
an intrinsic case study of Myanmar in order to get a better grasp of religious – 
Buddhist in particular – nationalism. The selection of Myanmar for a situational 
analysis case study is determined by, first of all, the great illustration it provides 
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to the global issue of religious nationalism and secondly by the little amount of 
previous research regarding the matter. Moreover, the urgency of the situation 
makes it necessary to shed light on one of the country’s major problems and to 
attempt to explain the causes and consequences of the current troubles. The focus 
on Myanmar allows a more in-depth response to a very broad and topical 
question, despite the fact that it does not seek to provide a case for generalisation. 
In fact, a matter such as this one has very unique and subjective paths and 
incentives and makes it impossible to simplify. This makes the use of an 
unstructured approach more convenient, because it allows a focus on a particular 
phenomena, thus facilitating the understanding of the processes and impulses 
leading to the actual outcomes of our issue by “trading generalizability and 
comparability for internal validity and contextual and evaluative understanding” 
(Maxwell, 2014). This represents a strength, but it also constitutes a weakness 
since it does not facilitate the assessment of cause and effect relationship, thus it 
might not be representative of the larger problem being investigated (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2000). For example, despite the universal issue of both nationalism and 
religion, the reasons, causes and consequences of Buddhist nationalism in 
Myanmar can not be transferable to another country with similar concerns, such 
as Sri Lanka or India, and it is most certainly not possible to generalize those to 
other religious nationalisms such as the ones linked to Islam, Judaism, etc. 
However, the results and conclusions of this paper will seek to fill a gap in the 
current academic literature and hopefully open up doors to further research 
regarding the matter.  
3.4 Data analysis 
The data will mainly be assessed using a narrative framework. This approach will 
allow an analysis in line with the constructionist incline of this study, as well as a 
holistic study of different viewpoints, claims and stories from a vast range of 
voices (lay people, politicians, monks, journalists, etc.). In its simplest definition, 
a narrative is a story, a “spoken or written account of connected events” (Oxford 
English Dictionnary, 2014) which may occur in material such as films, textbooks, 
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media, speeches, educational material, conversations, personal life accounts, and 
so on (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012). Narratives are produced through the cultural 
constructions of societies, and additionally to the abovementioned, they include 
collectively composed stories such as myth and commemorative practices in 
which individuals engage through their own cultural partaking. In other words, 
they are stories that structure the collective memory of a group or a wider 
population, as “they navigate the process of identity development in the midst of 
intractable conflict” (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012:76).  
The choice of using a narrative analysis was made because of the importance it 
gives to context, by providing a sense of the relation between people, settings and 
behaviours. In fact, narratives have the advantage of offering both individuals and 
collectives with an awareness of purpose and place, giving space for shared 
stories in a particular culture, which provide grounds for common understandings 
and interpretations (Patterson & Monroe, 2012). Moreover, the assumption that 
people – may they be governmental officials, religious personalities or regular 
citizens – reason, perceive, imagine and make moral decisions according to these 
narrative constructions (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012) makes the understanding of 
an issue like ours, drawing from ideological identification and collective beliefs, 
highly compatible with a narrative analysis.  
The relation between shared narratives, national identity and history is a corner 
stone in the development of nationalist movements such as the one taking place in 
Myanmar. Indeed, like mentioned in the previous chapter, the use of folk 
narratives, common history or ideological identities to modify and/or challenge 
interpretations of history and the relationships among people has been largely 
accepted in the country in order to reinforce and consolidate the nation. Stories 
about the origin, the development and the future of a nation-state provide a 
common sense of identity (who we are, where we come from, how we fit 
together), thus playing a central role in popular culture, in education, and in 
politics in general (Patterson & Monroe, 1998).  In fact, the idea of nations being 
“imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991) is illustrated in the case of Myanmar, 
	   	  34 
where storylines of Buddhism and national identity are highlighted in order to 
create a sense of collective purpose and “purity”. The groups at various levels – 
regional or national – actively construct and reconstruct their identities, the 
meanings revolving around them; they interpret their own past, present and future 
through narratives.  
Moreover, like Hammack & Pilecki (2012) argue, there is also a close relationship 
between national and personal identity, and individuals tend to construct personal 
storylines that often mirror larger national narratives. This provides a sense of 
personal coherence that is created through the integration of elements of the 
national and collective narratives into the private, which explains the fact that 
individuals respond to the threat of identity uncertainty and fragmentation by 
defending their religion, race, sex, etc. with the help of story making, national 
discourses and imagined collectivity (Anderson, 1991). All those elements, 
central to the establishment and reinforcement of national identity but also of 
narratives like the ones expressed against the Rohingya, need to be scrutinized 
and assessed in order to understand Myanmar’s actual situation.  
In order to do so, this study will draw upon Elliot Misclher’s (in Stalker, 2010) 
argument that narratives should be considered as praxis. When doing so, we are 
assuming that there is a “dialectical relationship between individual’s position as 
both subjects (active agents) and objects (adaptation to social structures)” 
(Mischer in Stalker, 2010: 595). Narratives are thus social actions that represent 
adaptation, defiance and adoption of a certain set of norms. They are situated in 
time and place, and represent an answer to a socially posed question, that in our 
case lies in the nature and place of minorities like the Rohingya in the Burmese 
society. Furthermore, Mischler also asserts that they constitute identity 
performances, a way of presenting who one is and what one believes in.  
In regard to the reading, interpreting and analysing of the narratives, a more 
holistic approach seems appropriate for this study. In fact, in contrast to the 
categorical perspective of content analysis, which dissects the narratives in 
different units belonging to specific categories before analysing them, the holistic 
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method takes the story as a whole and sections of the narrative are interpreted in 
the context of other parts of the story. Another dimension that needs to be taken 
into account for the assessment of information is the distinction between content 
and form. In this case study, the attention will be given to the content of the 
account/speech/text, etc., might it be explicit – what happened, why it did, who 
was involved, and so on – or implicit, meaning that is conveyed, the motives 
displayed, the symbolic behind the narrative, and so on (Lieblich, Tuval-Mashiach 
and Zilber, 1998). Thus, the form, in other words the structure of the story, its 
complexity and coherence, its style or the choice of words, will be set aside, even 
though some elements of form analysis might interfere in the content scrutiny. 
Moreover, due to the fact that no field-study will be done for this research, a 
secondary analysis of a set of existing data will be conducted in order to find 
answers to the research question.  
All those elements make narrative analysis a methodology – not only a method – 
that perceives the world from a social constructivist perspective, which fits into 
the overall framework of this research. In fact, the latter is interested in how the 
concept of Buddhist nationalism came about in Myanmar, which is essential to 
understanding the particular meaning it has today and why it has been maintained. 
In order to do this, the influence of Foucault (1978) will be taken into account, 
thus the aim will be to reveal the ways in which meanings serve particular 
interests, since we cannot embrace language as neutral towards political and 
historical forces, but we need to think of it as embedded within a context of power 
and domination. Hence, the purpose of the analysis will be to depict the ways in 
which leaders – political or religious – use narratives to frame particular issues 
and to motivate support and adherence to the Burmese agenda.  
3.5 Limitations 
This research would undeniably have gained depth and validity from a field-
study, but due to time and budget constraints the focus will be put on secondary 
sources. Those will be taken into account in relation to each other, and as a whole, 
in order to get the general impressions on the situation. According to Hinds, 
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Vogel and Steffen (1997), two general methodological issues are present when 
conducting a secondary analysis. First of all, the degree to which the data 
generated by individual qualitative methods are appropriate to a subordinate 
analysis can be questioned, and second, the extent to which the research purpose 
of the latter can diverge from that of the initial study without invalidating its effort 
and findings.  
Moreover, it is important to note that a significant part of the material used for 
this paper have been developed in a Western context, thus relying on concepts and 
understandings that might be different from what is perceived by the actual actors 
in the matter. This issue is strengthened by Burmese media censorship, which 
makes it hard to get a full grasp around the actual feelings and perceptions of the 
local people, whether monks, Muslim minorities or government officials.  
5. Discussion  
All religions have a relatively important political dimension, just as many political 
institutions are impregnated, to some extent, by a particular faith. Due to western 
stereotypes of Buddhism as “other-worldly” (Max Weber in Harris, 2007), little 
attention has been given to the religion’s intertwinement with state matters and 
the consequences Buddhist nationalism has on state transition, ethnic interactions 
and globalisation. In Myanmar, Buddhism has until today exercised a significant 
role in the country’s history, culture and political processes. In this final chapter, 
an analysis will be made of religion’s role and power in the Burmese nationalist 
movement, as well as its use for political purposes and the respect of its teachings 
in doing so. First, the claims, goals and actual actions of Myanmar’s main 
religious nationalist actors – the monkhood, the laity and the government – will be 
assessed in order to consider how the three construct and make use of this 
dynamic. In parallel, the actual use of religion for political and nationalistic 
purposes will be presented, as well as the different interpretations on the 
consistency between the Buddhist teachings and the actual narratives and 
following actions. Finally, because of the imminence of the conflicts that are 
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taking place between Buddhists and Muslims, the broader implications of these 
ethnical and religious clashes will be presented.  
5.1 Analysis of narratives, actions and role of Buddhism  
Based on claims that the Rohingya are descendants of the Bengali migrant 
population and putting forward the 1982 Burman Citizenship Law, which refuses 
to recognize the Rohingya as an ethnic group within the country, a growing 
number of Burmese Buddhists legitimise and even encourage discrimination 
against the said minority. Three main groups compose this nationalist framework: 
the monkhood, the state and to a smaller extent, the laity. Together, they have 
shaped Myanmar’s current politico-religious landscape and have contributed to 
form a unique and powerful nationalist dynamic infused with religion (Long, 
2013). This part of the study will first assess each group’s claims and actions, in 
order to subsequently examine how they are intertwined and what dynamics exist 
in their relationships.  
5.1.1 Burmese monks with nationalist ambitions  
The marginalization – and to some extent detestation – of the Rohingya has been 
pushed to another level by a section of nationalist/racist monks, led by Ashin 
Wirathu, who are re-igniting that sentiment by expressing open hatred and 
propagating a sentiment of fear for Muslim minorities – and Islam in general – to 
the society. In fact, the monkhood (also called the Sangha), as Buddhism’s 
traditional guardian of morality, has the responsibility to protect the religion (the 
Śāsana) in accordance to the Vinaya (the monk’s code of discipline). This is what 
they are supposedly doing through various acts of violence and the propagation of 
hate-speeches across the country (Long, 2013).  
The first argument supporting this intolerance lies in the idea of an Islamic 
invasion and menace, and in the need to protect Myanmar’s Buddhist heritage 
(Arai, 2013). In fact, there is a deep running fear of a Muslim demographic 
explosion, which might disrupt the Burmese Buddhist identity. According to the 
Buddhist Rakhine State government spokesperson, the Rohingya are trying to 
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“Islamise Buddhists through their terrible birth rate” (Coates, 2013), which is, as 
said by the same person, ten times higher than native Buddhists’. Additionally, 
according to testimonies and interview reports collected by Tatsushi Arai (2013), 
Bamar Buddhists explain their apprehension by the fact that many Rohingya seem 
to fail to assimilate Burmese customs and way of life and instead impose their 
culture and overwhelm the natal Buddhist traditions. In many interviews and 
speeches, both monks and lay people have expressed their fear of losing their 
Buddhist heritage and exemplify their anxiety with the case of Bangladesh, 
Malaysia or Pakistan, which used to have a large proportion of Buddhist 
population but are now majorly Muslim. This argument is not unique to 
Myanmar, as it has been expressed on a more global level in different 
circumstances. For instance, in Europe, the political neologism “Eurabia” 
designates an Islamic conspiracy theory forecasting an Islamised and Arabised 
Europe that will undermine the existing European culture and traditions (Ye’Or, 
2005). This islamophobic theory emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11, as well as 
in parallel with the increasing number of immigrants from Arabic countries and is 
used by far-right activists in countries with high immigration rates such as the UK 
or France (Kuper, 2012). Such thoughts have been strengthened over the years 
and the theory has received a wide media coverage following the 2011 Norway 
attacks by Anders Behring Breivik, who includes an intense supporting discussion 
on the Eurabia theory in his manifesto 2083: A European Declaration of 
Independence (Fekete, 2012). However, in the case of Myanmar, specialists and 
economists argue that there is no clear evidence of any superior Muslim birth rate 
or even an augmentation of the latter, but rather a net outflow of the Rohingya to 
Bangladesh and other neighbouring countries since 1950. 
The second narrative on which the said nationalists base their viewpoint is that the 
Rohingya “started it” by attempting to take over the Buddhist lands of Myanmar. 
According to several narrative testimonies, this belief is shared by many Buddhist 
monks or lay people, who focus on past events of separatist or sedition 
movements from the Rohingya. This argument has its roots in events that 
occurred after the country’s independence in 1948, when the minority formed a 
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guerrilla-fighting Mujahideen for a separate Islamic state or a merge with the 
current Bangladesh (ancient East Pakistan), leading a 13-year rebellion seen as a 
great betrayal by the Burmese Buddhists. Despite the fact that the movement 
ended up being defeated, the movement still brings out resentment because of the 
eventual threats it posed to the country’s recent sovereignty (Coates, 2013).  
The two aforementioned discourses are part of a wider attempt to build a national 
identity around a shared fear for the Other (Kinnvall, 2002), i.e the Muslims. By 
putting the fault on the Islamic part of the population – especially the Rohingya – 
these narratives demonize the Other, which serves as a justification for the 
schemes and acts targeting the “enemies” of the pure nation. Moreover, by 
focusing on a common factor, namely the lack of citizenship of the Rohingya that 
depicts them as foreigners as threats to the nation, the narratives on exclusion and 
marginalisation are reinforced and have factual, “valid” foundations.  
A third argument explaining Buddhist fear towards Muslims is the need to defend 
Myanmar’s Buddhist nation against the spread of globalization. What many 
Burmese nationalists argue is that today’s globalized world leans towards an 
increasing interaction between religious communities, and thus there is a danger 
of one religion taking over the others. Consequently, the fear of losing any 
supremacy in the country and the will to protect the Burmese race and religion 
pushes nationalist monks to reinforce the sense of in-group cohesion among 
Buddhists, and to defend themselves from the perceived threats posed by out-
groups that include Muslims, but also foreigners or the media (Arai, 2013). 
Additionally, as an outcome of Myanmar’s opening and government reforms, 
there has been an increase of international business interest in the country. Global 
capitalist giants are seeking to put their hands on the Burmese oil and natural gas 
reserves, which further divides the population. The fact that the speculating 
companies are either coming from, or in concurrence with, Middle-Eastern 
Muslim countries (Thompson, 2013) only increases the antipathy and controversy, 
as well as it intensifies the aforementioned idea that Islamic civilisations will take 
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over not only Myanmar, but the world as a whole, and that there is a need to 
prevent such an incident from happening.  
Like it has been expounded in chapter 3 (Theoretical Framework), the effect of 
globalisation and the country’s shift towards a certain modernization creates 
insecurity and uncertainty among its population, who, as a result, search for some 
sort of reaffirmation by drawing closer to elements that might reduce stress and 
apprehension. Like Kinnvall (2004) explicates, the combination of nationalism 
and religion is a powerful response to such uncertainties and anxieties, and the 
case of Myanmar illustrates this quite evidently. Without shadowing evident traits 
of chauvinism and racism in the Burmese nationalists’ discourses, it is necessary 
to make space for deeper explanations for the current happenings. It is also 
essential to remind that such changes in context, might they be political, 
economical and/or social, do in fact impact on the interactions between defined 
groups of people, thus challenging the perception of reality and the construction 
of identities. It is easy to denounce and criticize Myanmar’s Buddhist majority 
and the violence some of them are carrying out against the country’s Muslims, but 
it is important to take into account the context and the challenges that they face in 
their everyday life. In fact, after many decades of military rule and isolation from 
the external world, 30% of Myanmar’s population lives in poverty with many 
more on the verge of it. More than a third of the people are unemployed, and 
many Buddhists fear that even this number will escalate for their people, as many 
businesses are Muslim-owned. Even though this does not provide necessary 
justifications for the promotion of hatred, denigration and massacre, those aspects 
facilitate the understanding of how difficult and pungent the conditions are in the 
developing Myanmar, and how easily average Buddhists can be enrolled in 
nationalistic and chauvinist propaganda. Moreover, Burmese monks’ high and 
respected social status makes it difficult to formulate any reproaches towards 
them and insulates them from any criticism or hindering in their sayings and 
actions (Thompson, 2013).  
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Based on those arguments, Ashin Wirathu and his followers have spread a 
nationalistic powder calling for the unity of the Buddhist community against the 
common enemy that they feel menaces them of loosing their religion and race 
(Pinnock, 2013). The open resentment against Islam, and the Rohingya in 
particular, is not recent. In fact, Wirathu began preaching against Myanmar’s 
Muslims in 2001, but was arrested two years later and sentenced to 25 years of 
prison for handing out anti-Muslim pamphlets inciting communal riots, which 
resulted in the death of at least 10 Muslims by a Buddhist mob (Marshall, 2013). 
The monk was released in 2010 along with other political detainees as part of a 
general prisoner amnesty (Hodal, 2013). Since his liberation, Wirathu has been 
actively operating different nationalist campaigns and programs, such as the 969 
movement and legislation proposals.  
5.1.1.1 The 969 Movement 
One of the concrete actions taken by nationalist Buddhist monks is the 969 
movement, a Buddhist-led campaign intended to, on the one hand, build unity 
among Burmese Buddhists and on the other to marginalise Muslims. Lead by 
Ashin Wirathu, the movement’s stated goal is to stress the need for joint support 
among Bamar Burmese to patronize Buddhist-held businesses, and in the same 
time to boycott those owned by Muslims. Another justification lying behind the 
establishment of the 969 Movement is to “create a common symbol that enables 
all Buddhists to readily pay respect to the Triple Gems – the Buddha, the 
Dhamma (the teachings) and the Sangha (the community of monks)” (Arai, 2013: 
12). In fact, the 969 logo displays a Buddhist symbol illustrating an ancient pillar 
that King Ashoka – a famous Buddhist ruler – constructed during his ruling to 
promote unity among his subjects, as well as the Burmese numerals 969 and a 
chakra wheel (Arai, 2013). This religious unity goes along with the patriotic union 
that is intrinsic to nationalism, because by uniting Buddhists the Movement 
automatically sets aside the other religious minorities, and creates some sort of 
nationalism “undercover”.  
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The numbers 969 each represent the number of virtues associated with attributes 
of the Buddha, his teachings and the monkhood: the first 9 symbolises the nine 
special attributes of the Buddha, as the 6 represents the ones of the dhamma and 
the 9 stands for the sangha’s (Bookbinder, 2013). Stickers with the logo – one of 
the country’s most recognizable – are distributed and stuck on shops, homes, 
taxis, and other national businesses, and are at the same time signs of Buddhist 
cohesion but also of political and racial unrest (Marshall, 2013). Wirathu’s main 
argument for boycotting Muslim-owned businesses is that when buying a good 
from a Muslim commerce or production, the “money doesn’t stop there… it will 
eventually be used against [Buddhists] to destroy their race and religion”, which 
once against illustrates the important fear of being overwhelmed and Islamised 
(Bookbinder, 2013).  
Some argue that the 969 Movement is only a response to a Muslim method used 
to boycott Buddhist businesses, namely the 786 symbol. The latter is often 
adorning South Asians Muslim’s homes and businesses, as it is a numerical 
representation of the Islamic blessing “In the name of Allah, the Compassionate 
and Merciful” (bismillah-ir-rahman-ir-rahim). As numerology detains an 
important place in Burmese Buddhist culture, the 786 symbol is seen by many as 
a Muslim plan for world domination in the 21st century (Marshall for Reuters, 
2013) since 7 + 8 + 6 is equal to 21. The number 969 is intended to be the latter’s 
cosmological opposite, and seems to have originated from a functionary in the 
ministry of foreign affairs, U Kyaw Lwin, a specialist of traditional numerology 
whose book was written in the late 1990s. However, U Kyaw Lwin’s ideas really 
emerged in November 2012, when a religious order began to invoke them in local 
anti-Muslim campaigns (Coclanis, 2013). 
The 969 movement illustrates how the use of a religious symbol – here the triple 
gems – is used to enhance the unity and force of an identity, with the objective of 
providing a particular ideology and a guide for future actions (Kinnvall, 2004). In 
addition, the amplification of a chosen distress such as Islam’s potential 
overwhelm of the world or the 786 symbol becomes a basis for the use and 
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respect of the particular emblem, which has been facilitated by mass media and 
empiricist verifications of the mentioned “facts” (Aggestam & Kinnvall, 2002).  
5.1.1.2 Legislative propositions  
In line with the fear of being overwhelmed by Islam and additionally to the 969 
movement’s boycotting of Muslim businesses and hate speeches, Wirathu and his 
supporters are also gathering signatures for a petition called “Safeguarding the 
National Identity”, aimed at prohibiting interfaith marriage (Kyaw, 2013). This 
nationwide campaign encourages the public and the national parliament to adopt a 
proposed law on interreligious marriage. According to the initiators of the law, 
many cases of matrimonies between Buddhist women and Muslim men oblige the 
wives to convert to their husband’s Islamic faith. The law also seeks to manage 
population growth through the imposition of monogamous marriage, in an attempt 
to tackle what many Buddhists interpret as a social problem caused by Islamic 
practices menacing the moral character of their Buddhist-majority homeland 
(Arai, 2013). The proposed law amends that any Buddhist woman who wishes to 
marry a non-Buddhist man needs to get a written permission from her parents and 
show the document to the local authorities. Moreover, the future groom should 
convert to Buddhism, as failure to comply with these conditions could lead the 
husband-to-be to face prison (10 years) and property confiscation (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014a).  
The proposal has lead to controversial debates and has been denounced by several 
human rights organisations and women’s rights groups because of its infantilising 
and biased character. Despite the fact that the law’s instigators claim that the 
proposal aims at protecting Buddhist women, it on the contrary restricts their 
rights as well as it discriminates religious and ethnic minorities. If fact, the 
proposed legislation violates fundamental rights to liberty and religious belief as 
well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ prohibitions against 
discrimination. Furthermore, it is contrary to article 16 of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which Myanmar has 
ratified, just as it is against the country’s constitution which states that “the Union 
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shall not discriminate any citizen of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, based 
on race, birth, religion, official position, status, culture, sex and wealth”  
(Kayshap, 2014). In spite of this, President Thein Sein proposed that the marriage 
law ought to be drafted by the Nation Assembly in order to “preserve race and 
religion” (Human Rights Watch, 2014).  
Like it will be further argued below, this law proposal by nationalist monks and 
its support by the government shows the complex intertwinement of religious and 
state affairs in Myanmar, all embedded in a nationalist dynamic that aims at 
protecting the Burmese Buddhist identity by discriminating and “demonizing” the 
Other, i.e. the Rohingya.  
5.1.2 Governmental use of religion for nationalist purposes   
Given the fact that religion occupies an inherent place in the national heritage, its 
teachings, symbols and teachings have often been used as effective ways of 
communication and of legitimizing governmental actions (Jurgensmeyer, 2010). 
Religion’s prominent position in Burmese state affairs was first institutionalised 
in 1057, when Theravada Buddhism was adopted as a spiritual guide for the state. 
During the British and Japanese occupations, there were irregularities in its use 
and presence in the state affairs, even though it has always remained present in the 
background. Since the nation’s independence in 1948, the different national 
leaders have either endorsed Buddhism as a state religion, or otherwise utilized a 
spiritual discourse to legitimize their political status. Either way, Buddhist ideals 
have inspired the country’s governance, at the cost of relegating and disregarding 
the religious minorities, especially the Muslims (Arai, 2013).  
The relationship between state affairs and religion has always been tight, and the 
regime has since the country’s independence sought to pervade political beliefs 
with Buddhist value. For example, under U Nu’s ruling, democracy was 
advocated by naming it “Burmese Buddhist Way to Socialism” (Long, 2013), 
which combined the post-colonial nationalist ideology with a Buddhist 
connotation. U Nu went even further, when in an attempt to gain even more 
support form the Sangha he institutionalised Buddhism as the state religion. 
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However, this focus on Buddhism reinforced the tensions between the Buddhist 
majority and the non-Buddhist minorities, and disabled U Nu from answering the 
country’s demands for economic and infrastructural growth. This opened the door 
to Ne Win’s military and more secular power with a coup d’état in 1962 (Schober, 
2011). Ne Win strategically kept Buddhism in order to preserve the nation’s 
access to merit, but converted it to a civic religion, which would eventually 
benefit the government’s welfare programs. During this military regime, the non-
Buddhist minorities were depicted as impediments to a homogenous Burmese 
Buddhist laity, as they were seen as obstacles to a common national identity. This 
contributed to the general internalisation of the country’s nationalistic xenophobia 
(Long, 2013). The Rohingya’s position as the Other was doubled because, one the 
one hand they had rallied with the British during WWII they were associated with 
the destructive colonisation, and on the other they also differentiated from the 
majority because of their non-conformity to the Buddhist faith. Those two 
elements brought justification not only to the public perception of difference and 
the need to dissociate from the Rohingya, but also to the two cleansing operations 
(Naga Min in 1978 and Pyi Thaya in 1991) since they aimed at protecting the 
Burmese Buddhists as well as the Śāsana from a supposed threat (Schober, 2011).  
Even though the couple of past years have witnessed certain reform policies by 
the government as well as an opening of the country’s relations with the West, 
there has been recurring and rising violence against other Muslim communities 
(Akins, 2013). According to Zarni, (2013), the Burmese state has mobilized the 
society’s Islamophobia through various institutional mechanisms such as state 
media and social media sites (the president’s Facebook page for instance), but 
also by supporting – or at least allowing – different nationalist and even 
xenophobic undertakings (laws, speeches, clashes, etc.). For instance, Thein 
Nyun, chair of the New National Democracy Party, openly defended the 1982 
citizenship law by asserting that the latter “is intended to protect the Burmese 
Buddhist race; by not allowing those with mixed blood from making political 
decisions for the country, so the law is very important for the preservation of our 
country” (Democratic Voice of Burma, 2013 in Green, 2013). 
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Furthermore, governmental reforms have to some extent facilitated the spread of 
nationalistic speeches. Unlike the strict military rule held on the Burmese 
population during the junta’s period, the propagation of narratives has been 
facilitated by a new found freedom of speech that allows Buddhist monks such as 
Wirathu to spread ideas of Islamophobia and religious intolerance across the 
country (Coates, 2013). In fact, another active monk named Wimala claims that 
by permitting the 969 movement and allowing people to give speeches about 
religious and racial protection, a certain governmental support – and even 
encouragement – is assumed (Marshall, 2013). Moreover, government officials 
such as the minister of religious affairs Sann Sint, tend to deny any violent and 
xenophobic aspect of nationalist movements such as the 969 boycotting, and the 
latter has claimed that those sermons are “about promoting love and 
understanding between religions… It is impossible that he (i.e Wirathu) is inciting 
religious violence” (Marshall, 2013).  
What can be concluded from this sub-chapter is that there is a mutual support 
between nationalist monks and certain government officials, who pursue the same 
goal of getting rid of the Rohingya and other Muslim minorities in the country. 
Not only does the government stay silent on many aspects of the conflicts or on 
nationalist narratives, but the President Thein Sein has asserted that legally, the 
Rohingya were not citizens of Myanmar and that he wished to hand over the 
group to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in order to settle 
them in a different country than Myanmar, a proposal which is obviously 
encouraged by Buddhist monks (Akins, 2013). Indeed, a certain number of 
Buddhist monks showed their support by marching down in the streets in October 
2012 with banners and t-shirts displaying pictures of the President as the protector 
of Myanmar (Long, 2013). As they both seem guided by nationalistic motivations, 
the cooperation between state officials and the monkhood is thus expressed 
openly. In fact, it appears that Myanmar’s political authority and legitimacy is 
inherently based on religious elements, just as the spiritual cosmology shaping the 
country’s beliefs and traditions has political features. The state has used the 
Sangha’s moral authority, especially in the country’s emergence from the British 
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colonisation, to increase it’s own legitimacy. Likewise, it has allowed the latter to 
maintain its strong position by the nature of their affiliation.  
Like Jurgensmeyer (2010) argues, including religion into nationalism and state 
affairs kept the monkhood from building its own anti-national power, at the same 
time as it helped to provide a transcendent aura to nationalism. Similarly, the laity 
has, within the Buddhist cosmology, reformulated and used traditional 
responsibilities and roles in order to structure their everyday life in the 
contemporary reality. Buddhism has in fact incorporated itself in the social and 
political landscape in a complex net of authority, power, patronage and 
legitimacy. Together, institutional and spiritual policies have interacted and 
consequently shaped the country’s history and culture (Long, 2013). Religious 
nationalists have, and still do, read religious texts politically, which produces a 
new level of values based on those sacred writings (Friedland, 2013). This 
triangular relationship inserts itself perfectly in the nation-building process, which 
incorporates a reconstruction of a national and individual identity around shared 
fears and traumas as well as common motivations and values. Those revolved 
around the rejection of the British at first, but also of anything foreign like the 
Rohingya, who became targets of both anxiety and aversion (Long, 2013). 
Finally, it is important to stress that there is an evident division and inequality of 
power between those producing the Burmese nationalist discourse and those 
affected by it. In fact, prominent monks like Wirathu as well as government 
officials have the power to make the discourse “true” and to frame it in a 
particular way, a way that suits them and their interests best (Foucault, 1978). As 
it is the case in Myanmar, the power of the majority, who detains more resources 
and freedom than Muslim minorities, gives the former the “right” to dominate and 
marginalise the latter through a discourse of exclusion, since it is the Other 
(Kinnvall, 2004).  
5.2 Discrepancies with Buddhist teachings  
Like Beech (2013) writes in her article, “every religion can be twisted into a 
destructive force poisoned by ideas that are antithetical to its foundations”. In fact, 
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even though Wirathu argues that he is able to reconcile the peaceful sutras of 
Buddhism with the anti-Muslim violence he promulgates by the assertion that he 
is only protecting and defending his community, thus not being offensive but only 
defensive, there are some points that need to be highlighted in order to get a more 
critical grasp of the issue.  
First, it is important to note that the opinion regarding the consistency of the 
current nationalist narratives and ethnical clashes with Buddhist teachings has two 
sides. The outlook shared by the advocates of the 969 movement and the 
intermarriage law argue that if the intentions that stimulate and guide Buddhist 
social action are genuine and consistent with Buddhist teachings, then they will 
inevitably engender social impact that is harmless and beneficial to everybody in 
society. In regard to this, a national leader of the 969 Movement claimed that:  
“All acts under Buddhism are harmless to everybody. Buddhist acts 
performed with good intentions are like a train moving on a railway. If 
a dog crosses the railway and is run over by the train, that’s not the 
train’s fault. That’s the dog’s fault” (in Arai, 2013: 15).  
This contrasts with the opposite view among practitioners, who contend that there 
is a social responsibility for removing the suffering of others, without taking into 
account the goodness of their intentions associated with the causal chain of events 
that have generated the suffering. The Buddhists interviewed by Arai (2013) thus 
assert that: 
“The Buddha taught that we must take responsibility for the situation 
of suffering which we think we have caused. Buddhist teachings also 
encourage us to think that even if we haven’t caused particular 
situations of suffering, we should take action to remove the suffering. 
If you know the situations that cause the suffering, you have to take 
responsibility… The Buddha taught that our Buddhist consciousness 
must be able to see our deep bonds to our families, friends, nations, 
and the whole world” (in Arai, 2013: 16).  
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Second, Alan Strathern (2013) argues that the promise not to kill is one of– if not 
the – most important moral precepts infused in Buddhist monks, and the principle 
of non-violence is known as having a larger place in Buddhism than in any other 
major religion. In fact, the emphasis on karma and samsara – meaning that the 
cycle of birth and death is ruled by one’s individual actions – is contradictory to 
killing or any other immoral action, because of the negative karma that will 
inevitably follow, by coming back at one in their own lifetime or in following 
reincarnations. Hence, aggressive thoughts are opposed to any Buddhist 
teachings, as practical ways such as meditation are developed to eliminate them 
and give place for compassion and calm. Of course all religions have pacifist 
precepts, like the well-known Christian precept encouraging its followers to “love 
your enemies and pray for those who persecute you” (in Strathern, 2013: n.p), but 
however good-intentioned a faith is, “sooner of later it enters into a Faustian pact 
with state power” (Strathern, 2013: n.p) and violence is used in the name of a 
spiritual, greater good. Buddhism is, despite its positive image of peaceful and 
passive dogmas, not an exception. In fact there is a quite long history of Buddhist-
related acts such as torture, suicides, flagellation and wars. According to 
Jurgensmeyer and Jerryson (2010: 226), there are over sixteen hundred years of 
Buddhist violence on the Asian continent, many of them being contrary to the 
original guidelines.  
Furthermore, Buddhism, as a religious and philosophical system, should not be 
intertwined with political, economical or racial organisations such as nation states. 
In fact, According to the Vinaya – the monastic code of conduct – monks are not 
allowed to engage in any public, governmental affairs but for one exception: when 
the Śāsana – the dispensation of the Buddhist religion – is menaced. If that is the 
case, the sangha is collectively allowed to issue what is perceived as the ultimate 
moral reproach. This was the case when 20’000 monks, backed up by 100’000 lay 
people, demonstrated silently in Myanmar’s cities during what is commonly 
called the Saffron Revolution in September 2007. During the latter, the Sangha 
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marched with their alms bowls turned over, which indicated that any alms from 
the government and the military – or anyone associated with it – would be 
refused, thus depriving the regime of any eventual merit and delegitimizing its 
members (Long, 2013). Moreover, the Buddhist and Burmese academic Maung 
Zarni (2013) explains that Buddhism is “not about people imagining a national 
community predicated upon adversarial relations but rather about using one’s own 
intellectual faculties to see through the non-existent core-essence of the self” 
(n.p). Yet, this humanistic precept seems to have been forgotten and put behind by 
many of those who profess their adherence to Buddhist faith in Myanmar, and has 
thus been incapable of guarding against overarching societal prejudices and 
nationalist proponents. In fact many Burmese who consider themselves guardians 
of the faith, who practice religious rituals and patronize Buddhist institutions do at 
the same time profess hate-speeches and even commit violent acts against anyone 
or anything they see as enemies of Buddhism as well as its wealth, its followers, 
and in this case: its land. Zarni (2013) further claims that the latter do not 
reconcile with Buddhism’s guiding principles of tolerance, non-discrimination 
and inclusion, but instead clearly contradicts with their image of wardens of 
security and purity.  So how can this discrepancy be explained? How come some 
of Buddhism’s core principles have been forgotten in favour of chauvinistic and 
nationalist ideologies?  
One explanation lies in the fact that one should not see the anti-Rohingya 
pogroms as a religious war, as inter-religious confrontations, but rather as an 
exploitation of religion and its identities for political and social purposes (Malik, 
2013). In fact, religion does not create the tension as much as it helps to establish 
chauvinist identities through which certain factions are demonized and immoral 
actions justified. This means, according to Malik, that “the importance of 
Buddhism in the conflicts in Myanmar (…) is not that the tenets of the faith are 
responsible for the pogroms, but that those bent on confrontation have adopted the 
garb of religion as a means of gaining a constituency and justifying their actions” 
(n.p). Gravers’ (2013) argument supports the latter, by claiming that Buddhism 
itself is not the source of the violent confrontations in Burma, but is rather a 
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medium of politics, might it be against a repressive regime, as a basis for 
nationalist authoritarian regime, or even as part of violent xenophobic struggles 
against minorities. 
A parallel answer might be the universal rhetoric, irrespective of religion, of 
violence for the sake of peace, as a defence and as an inevitable act for better ends 
on the long term. In the case of Buddhism in Myanmar, Michael Jerryson asserts 
that even though violence and hatred is seen as an infraction and results in bad 
karma, the vehement and ferocious actions are done for the greater good, which is 
more important than the individual well being (Jerryson in Shadbolt, 2013).  
Despite those attempts at explaining the current confrontations, it seems important 
to underscore the fact that the Dalai Lama has, in a speech done in May 2013, 
spoken out against Wirathu’s actions and the 969 Movement by arguing that a 
true practitioner of Buddhism would not tolerate such violence and hatred. In fact, 
while some of the spiritual discourses might be complete and coherent with the 
Buddhist belief system, they lack concrete answers that address the structural 
inequity and the humanitarian consequences that their actions – direct or indirect 
– produce through the complex chain of globalisation, state transformation and 
modernisation. 
5.3 Broader implications of the conflicts  
The religious tensions that first started in Rakhine state have spread more 
generally in Myanmar, and might now threaten the whole regional security with a 
spill-over to the neighbouring countries. The inter-religious violence taking place 
in various parts of the country has in fact provoked tensions between Buddhists 
and Muslims in Malaysia, Indonesia or Thailand – all three having large Rohingya 
refugee communities – and there are apprehensions that the clashes inside the 
country may spread to Muslims and Buddhists outside Myanmar, which could 
lead to a rancorous cycle of reprisals and counter-reprisals in the Southeast Asian 
region. Surin Pitsuwan, former head of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) has already warned the regional government officials about the 
imminent spill-over effects of the violence caused by the increasing religious and 
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nationalist radicalisation (Zappei, 2014). In fact, Buddhist nationalism and 
radicalism is increasing in other parts of Southeast Asia, with nationalist groups 
composed of, among others, monks who orchestrate the destruction of Muslim or 
Christian property in Sri Lanka or monk-military cooperation for defensive – and 
even offensive – measures, which increases the alienation felt by minority 
Muslims (Beech, 2013). For instance, retaliatory attacks have occurred between 
Muslims and Buddhists in Kuala Lumpur, and there are concerns about radical 
Muslims outside Myanmar exploiting the situation to recruit followers and 
support their extremist narratives. This might in turn feed the nationalist Buddhist 
discourses deeming that foreign radicals support and influence Muslim ethnic 
groups such as the Rohingya (Coates, 2013).  
It is thus an important security concern for the region to hinder the rise of 
radicalism, because of its possible evolution into terrorist threats or actions 
against a government of a specific group. Some incidents have already occurred, 
like an attempt of assault on the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta by Islamist 
extremists, or the bombing of a Buddhist site in India (International Crisis Group, 
2013). It is important to note, however, that such actions have not always been 
recognised by Islamist groups, but might be organised by other Buddhist factions 
only to incriminate the Muslim side and thus justify any violent actions towards 
them. In fact, certain Muslim groups abroad claim that the Buddhist nationalist 
community stage drama in order to gain sympathy ahead of the general election in 
Myanmar in 2015 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014). 
However, some threats are openly recognized, like the one sent by the Indonesian 
radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir – now imprisoned – who wrote a letter to 
President Thein Sein where he threatens of violent jihad against Myanmar 
justified by the persecution of the Rohingya (Coates, 2013).  
Another broader issue derived from the Buddhist-Muslim conflicts is the 
increasing number of refugees. As the hatred, tension and conflicts get more 
intense, the number of Rohingyas seeking asylum in the bordering countries 
explodes, which leads to further violations of human rights by both state and non-
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state actors. In fact, because of their lacking citizenship, the Rohingya are often 
labelled as illegal economic migrants, and thus have to face arrests, deportation or 
labour exploitation instead of the needed protection. Moreover, the legal 
framework regarding the issue is quite inefficient and even lacking in the 
Southeast Asian region, despite international pressure and civil society advocacy. 
In fact, only two out of ten members of ASEAN – Philippines and Cambodia – 
have ratified the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol attached to it (Asia Pacific Refugees Rights 
Network, 2013). Important destination countries such as Malaysia, Bangladesh or 
Thailand are thus short on adequate legal measures to identify and protect 
Rohingya refugees and asylum seekers, which has lead to irresponsible 
government policies and practices such as arbitrary arrests, deportations and 
detainments which violate many obligations and rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Also, the demographic side of the matter should 
not be neglected. In Bangladesh for example, the massive flow of refugees – 
mostly from the Rohingya community – has had an important impact on the 
demographic profile of southeast Bangladesh. With approximately 29’000 
Rohingya refugees within the UNHCR registration system, added to the 200’000 
ones residing in the country as illegal migrants, the pressure on Bangladesh is 
critical (Refugees International, 2011). Being one of the less developed countries 
of the region with an important population density of more than 900 per square 
meter, the pressure on essential resources such as land and water is high. This 
resource scarcity, coupled with the demographic pressure and the somewhat 
unstable internal security has lead the country to close its borders to more 
refugees, despite repeated requests from several human rights groups, the 
UNHCR and numerous countries. However, the border with Myanmar being 271 
kilometres long makes its management quasi-impossible, which creates 
opportunities for increased transnational crime such as human trafficking or drug 
and arm smuggling (Bashar, 2012).  
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6. Conclusion  
As a conclusion to this case study, it seems important to stress the complex and 
transcendent intertwinement between religion and nationalism in Myanmar. The 
arguments exposed in this thesis go against the traditional Western scholarship’s 
tendency to be impregnated with an “orientalist” view of Buddhism, suggested by 
Max Weber’s perception of it as an “other-worldly” spiritual system functioning 
apart from social and political dynamisms. In fact, the abovementioned arguments 
show that Buddhism is, like the other world religions such as the Abrahamic 
faiths, linked to politics and other state affairs (Long, 20143). 
First, this research has stressed that the use of religion for nationalistic purposes 
can be presented as a way of binding the Burmese population together around a 
shared identity – Bamar Buddhism – but also through common fears and 
insecurities. Because of the important place detained by Buddhism in the Burmese 
society, its teachings and symbols have in fact been adopted as a way to unify the 
people around a common identity and a transcending “truth”. Religion has 
accordingly helped to reformulate and structure Burmese narratives in uncertain 
times, by inserting itself in the social and political landscape, in a setting filled 
with power, authority and a quest for national purity. 
Second, Theravada Buddhism seems to be the link that holds the triangular 
relationship between the monkhood, the laity and the state. Spiritual, societal and 
institutional features have in fact interacted and shaped the country’s political and 
cultural landscape in complex dynamics, which have always been more or less 
influenced by religion. Religious texts are read politically, just as political 
narratives are infused with religion, which inserts itself neatly – but dangerously – 
in the nation-building process of this transforming country. Despite the debate 
around the consistency of these narratives and actions with Buddhist teachings, 
what is certain is that in the context of the current tensions and conflicts occurring 
in Myanmar, it is not as much Buddhism in itself that has lead to the actual 
situation but rather its use to establish chauvinist sermons towards the Muslim 
minorities. In other words, the faith’s teachings and symbols are not 
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fundamentally preaching violence or hatred, but have been utilised to gain 
constituency and to justify vehement discourses and actions (Zarni, 2013).  
Finally, it is necessary to mention that Myanmar’s ethnic and inter-religious 
tensions might represent one of the country’s biggest challenges to a full 
democratization, not only because of the biased elective representation, but also 
because of the terrible humanitarian consequences this religious nationalism has 
on the country’s relegated minorities. Also, the imminent spill-over effects that 
threaten the rest of the Southeast Asian region are not to be neglected, as they 
might create turbulence between the interested governments and increase the 
human casualties. To resume, as Myanmar is emerging from half a century of 
authoritarian, military rule, a new era towards democracy, globalisation and 
innovation is being opened and we ought to hope that it’s leaders will find a way 
to use Buddhism in its most constructive, fruitful and tolerant ways. 
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Appendix 1 - Map of Myanmar 
	  
Source: Outside Online. Available at http://www.outsideonline.com/adventure-
travel/asia/myanmar/The-Jesus-Kissed-War-Fringed-Love-Swirled-Rangers.html Accessed 01 
May 2014) 
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Appendix 2 - Map of Rakhine 
	  
Source: Radio Free Asia. Available at: http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/violence-
10252012182913.html (Accessed 25 April 2014) 
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Appendix 3 - Table of casualties and injuries in Rakhine 
Summary list of casualties and injuries in townships of Rakhine state caused by 
clashes between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims (as of 30 July 2012).  
Township Casualty   Injury   
 Rakhine Rohingya Total Rakhine Rohingya Total 
Sittway 11 23 34 35 22 57 
Ponnagyun - - - - - - 
Myauk U - - - - - - 
Kyauktaw - 4 4 - - - 
Pauktaw - 3 3 6 10 16 
Rathedaung 10 4 14 3 26 29 
Buthidaung - 1 1 - - - 
Maungdaw 10 10 20 6 - 6 
Yanbye - 1 1 - - - 
Minpyar - - - - 1 1 
Total 31 46 77 50 62 112 
Source: Kipgen (2013) 
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Appendix 4 - 969 Symbol 
 
Source: Courrier International Online. Available at 
http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2013/07/25/birmanie-moines-et-militaires-meme-
combat?page=all (Accessed 25 April 2014)	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